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CONCISE COMMUNICATION
Applying the ‘no-one worse off’ criterion to design
Pareto efficient HIV responses in Sudan and Togo
Robyn M. Stuarta,b, Hassan Haghparast-Bidgolic,
Jasmina Panovska-Griffithsd,e,f, Laura Grobickic,g, Jolene Skordisc,
Cliff C. Kerra,h, David J. Kedzioraa,c,h,i, Rowan Martin-Hughesa,
Sherrie L. Kellya,i and David P. Wilsona,i
Introduction: Globally, there is increased focus on getting the greatest impact from
available health funding. However, the pursuit of overall welfare maximization may
mean some are left worse off than before. Pareto efficiency takes welfare shifts into
account by ruling out funding reallocations that worsen outcomes for any person or
group.
Methods: Using the Optima HIV model, studies of HIV response efficiency were
conducted in Sudan in 2014 and Togo in 2015. In this article, we estimate the welfare
maximizing and Pareto efficient allocations for these two national HIV budgets, using
data from the original studies.
Results: We estimate that, if the 2013 HIV budget for Sudan was annually available to
2020 but with funds reallocated according to the welfare maximizing allocation, a 36%
reduction in cumulative new infections could be achieved between 2014 and 2020.We
also find that this is Pareto efficient. In Togo, however, we find that it is possible to
reduce overall new infections but applying the Pareto efficiency criterion means that
shifts in emphases cannot occur in the HIV response without additional resources.
Discussion: Protecting service coverage for key population groups is not necessarily
equivalent to protecting health outcomes. In some cases, requiring Pareto efficiency
may reduce the potential for population-wide welfare gains, but this is not always the
case.
Conclusion: Pareto efficiency may be an appropriate addition to the quantitative
toolset for evaluating HIV responses.
Copyright  2019 Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc. All rights reserved.
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Introduction
The efficient allocation of health resources is an
important objective for health systems as populations
age, the global burden of noncommunicable disease
grows, and health financing stagnates. Broadly speaking,
efficiency measures whether the best outcomes are being
obtained for a given budget [1], but to make use of this
very broad definition it is necessary to understand what is
meant by ‘best outcomes’, and what barriers might exist
to obtaining them. Efficiency studies often focus on
quantitatively answering the latter question [2], but the
former is more subjective, and even if we agree on a way
to quantify an individual’s health outcomes, a separate set
of complications arises when it comes to aggregating
across individuals to determine net social welfare [3,4].
Quantifying social welfare becomes pertinent when
considering allocative efficiency, that is, evaluating how
resources are allocated across interventions. A healthcare
system can generally be considered allocatively efficient if
no other allocation would increase overall population
welfare. However, the pursuit of a welfare maximizing
outcome may mean that some are left worse off than they
were before. Pareto efficiency or Pareto optimality is an
alternative efficiency criterion that considers these
welfare shifts: an allocation is Pareto efficient/optimal if
there is no other allocation that would make one
individual better off without making at least one other
individual worse off. (A third efficiency criterion,
Kaldor–Hicks efficiency, combines aspects of both these
criteria by allowing for hypothetical compensation of
those made worse off. Thus, a welfare-maximizing
outcome could be Kaldor–Hicks efficient even if not
Pareto efficient. However, Kaldor–Hicks efficiency
requires the assumption that utility is transferable, which
is not the case for health.) Pareto efficiency is rarely used
in health economics, because generally speaking, any
reallocation of health resources will result in at least one
person being worse off [5]. We therefore propose to
consider a response Pareto efficient if no defined
demographic or risk group can be made better off
without some other group being made worse off. This
population-group definition is less restrictive than an
individual-level definition and potentially more useful,
given that evaluation of health responses often considers
the impact on certain population cohorts, particularly
those at greater risk.
In this study, we compare two allocation strategies –
welfare maximizing and Pareto efficiency – for evaluating
HIV responses. We propose that it may be appropriate to
aim for ‘group Pareto efficiency’ in the context of
infectious diseases. We begin by presenting some theory
for Pareto efficiency for infectious diseases. Next, we
investigate HIV programmatic priority setting using two
country examples, based on HIV allocative efficiency
studies conducted in Sudan [6] and Togo [7]. To
investigate allocation strategies, we use Optima HIV, a
mathematical model designed to facilitate estimation of
the welfare maximizing allocation of HIV resources. We
describe how the model’s optimization algorithm was
extended to estimate Pareto efficient allocations. We
show that, in Sudan, the welfare maximizing allocation
was Pareto efficient, but in Togo the welfare-maximizing
allocation was not Pareto efficient.
Methods
Theory of Pareto efficiency in infectious diseases
To outline the key theoretical aspects, we consider a
simplified epidemic context with two programs, one
targeted at female sex workers (FSW) and the other at
people who inject drugs (PWID). A total budget of $2m
is split equally between the two programs. The number of
newHIV infections acquired by FSWand PWID depends
on how much of the budget is allocated to each program.
Figure 1 presents two possible scenarios. In the first
(Fig. 1a), there is limited mixing between FSW and
PWID, so reducing new infections in one population
does not greatly affect the other. In the second (Fig. 1b),
injection is the primary mode of HIV transmission, and
infections acquired by PWID are sexually transmitted to
FSW. In this instance, it benefits both populations to shift
more funding toward the PWID program.
Scenarios like those presented in Fig. 1b distinguish the
theory of Pareto efficiency in infectious diseases from
how it is usually applied in welfare economics, where it is
assumed that people’s utility increases monotonically with
the share of resources they are allocated. This implies that
Pareto improvements are only possible via technical
efficiency improvements, increasing budgets, or utility
transfers. However, for communicable diseases, prevent-
ing a primary case in one population may avert multiple
downstream infections due to the dynamic nature of
pathogen transmission. Pareto efficiency has been
considered in theoretical infectious disease models [8–
10], but not extensively in real-world settings.
Using Optima HIV to determine welfare-
maximizing and Pareto efficient allocations
Optima HIV is an epidemic model linked to a
programmatic response module that can estimate the
optimal allocation of a total HIV budget across different
programs for a given objective and set of intervention cost
functions [11]. The entire population can be divided into
as many subpopulations as required to capture variation in
vulnerability to HIV infection. We consider an example
where the population P is divided intoN subpopulations,
denoted Pi (i¼ 1,. . .,N), and the HIV response has
M programs with annual budgets Bj ( j¼ 1,. . .,M). We
call (B1,. . .,BM) allocation A. The health outcomes of
population Pi depend on A, so we write Oi(A) where O
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stands for outcomes. The health outcome of the entire
population is the sum of outcomes in each subpopulation,
that is, O Að Þ ¼PNi¼1 Oi Að Þ.
To determine the welfare-maximizing allocation, we
choose the health outcome O of interest (typically new
HIV infections, disability-adjusted life years, deaths, or
another country-specific outcome), and find the alloca-
tionA that solves the optimization problemminAO Að Þ,
subject to the constraint that the overall budget B ¼PM
j¼1 B j remains constant.
Extending this to include Pareto efficiency requires the
additional constraint:
min
A
O Að Þ subject to Oi Að Þ  Oi ABð Þ;
where AB is the baseline allocation. It is easy to show that
the A that solves this is Pareto efficient, as the constraint
combined with the minimization ensures that it is
welfare-maximizing with no subpopulation worse off.
Overview of HIV allocative efficiency studies
conducted in Sudan and Togo
In 2014, Sudan’s national AIDS program reviewed its
National Strategic Plan on HIV and prepared a concept
note for the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria (the Global Fund), and in 2015, the Government
of Togo underwent the same process. Each country
approached the World Bank with a request to conduct
allocative efficiency analyses to inform the prioritization
of their HIV responses and the development of their
Global Fund concept notes. In both cases, analyses
focused on how HIV resources should be allocated for
greatest epidemiological impact. TheOptimaHIVmodel
was applied in both country’s processes.
Evaluating funding allocations in Sudan and Togo
In Sudan, the primary objective of the study was to
minimize new infections over 2014–2020, which meant
determining the welfare-maximizing allocation of the
HIV budget. In Togo, the primary objective was to
minimize a combination of deaths and new infections
over 2015–2020 whilst ensuring that infections did not
increase in any subpopulation. This meant exploring
whether there were allocations that were Pareto superior
to the 2014 allocation. For this study, we estimated both
the welfare-maximizing and Pareto efficient allocation for
both countries.
Results
In Sudan, we found that, even if overall investment in
HIV does not increase, there is a welfare maximizing
allocation that could attain a 36% reduction in cumulative
new infections over 2014–2020 (Fig. 2a). This realloca-
tion is also estimated to reduce infections in each
subpopulation and is therefore Pareto efficient.
Pareto efficient HIV responses in Sudan and Togo Stuart et al. 1249
Fig. 1. Pareto efficiency and welfare maximization. The dashed, dotted, and solid black lines represent the number of new HIV
infections acquired by female sex workers, people who inject drugs, and the total population, respectively. The status quo
allocation is for US$1m to be allocated to the people who inject drugs program and US$1m to the female sex workers program. (a)
A scenario with limited mixing between the two populations, so reducing new infections in one population doesn’t greatly reduce
infections in the other, although overall infections can be reduced by shifting funding to people who inject drugs programs. (b) A
scenario where shifting funds to people who inject drugs also reduces infections in female sex workers, because the majority of
infections in female sex workers are acquired through sexual contact with people who inject drugs.
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In contrast, in Togo, we found that the latest reported
allocation of investments was already close to welfare
maximizing (Fig. 2b). However, the welfare-maximizing
allocation implied a 7% increase in cumulative new
infections among males aged 15–24 years (despite a 5%
reduction in new infections overall), and thus is not
Pareto efficient. We found no Pareto-improving
allocations of the HIV budget in Togo, indicating that
any shift from status quo investment patterns would make
at least one subpopulation worse off.
Complex epidemic dynamics mean that shifting funds
away from a particular population may not translate to an
increase in infections in that population. This can be
1250 AIDS 2019, Vol 33 No 7
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Fig. 2. Cumulative HIV infections projected under the baseline, Pareto efficient, and welfare-maximizing allocations of HIV
budgets in (a) Sudan and (b) Togo. The allocations are shown in Table 1 of the Supplementary materials, http://links.lww.com/
QAD/B438.
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observed for Sudan, where new infections among the
general population were projected to decrease despite
defunding prevention programs targeted at this popula-
tion (effectively a kind of compensation: those who gain
from reallocation ‘compensate’ others by lowering their
HIV acquisition risk). Likewise, mother-to-child trans-
mission (MTCT) was projected to decline even if funding
for prevention of MTCT were to decrease. In both
cases, this is due to the large proportion of new infections
(1/3 in 2014) contributed by sex work [6], and the
relative cost-effectiveness of preventing infections among
sex workers.
Discussion
In the context of infectious diseases, preventing primary
cases may avert multiple downstream infections, so
programs that are most effective at averting primary cases
are not necessarily those that will maximize overall
population health. Mathematical models have proven
useful for estimating the cumulative downstream effects of
responses [12]. In this study, we proposed an extension for
how models can be used, namely as a tool for estimating
the scope for Pareto improvements.
One limitation of this study is that the type of Pareto
efficiency we have considered is not the typical
individual-level definition, and is thus sensitive to the
subpopulations considered. For example, the welfare-
maximizing allocation in Togo was characterized as
Pareto inferior to the baseline allocation because it meant
an increase in infections among males aged 15–24 years.
However, had a different population grouping been
defined for analysis (e.g., grouping all males aged 15–49
years), the welfare-maximizing allocation would have
been Pareto efficient. If the subpopulations are small
enough, it may be impossible to find a Pareto superior
allocation. We also do not consider potential redistribu-
tions of health within subpopulations. However, within
HIV there are standard key populations (e.g., FSW,
MSM, and PWID) of interest, and protecting the
health outcomes of these groups could be done fairly
consistently. The existence of a Pareto superior allocation
also depends on the programs considered: if programs are
divided into intervention implementation modalities,
finding a Pareto optimal allocation may be easier. We also
note the limitations of Pareto efficiency itself as a social
choice rule. Its drawbacks (including the disregard of
equality, social welfare, or resource wastage) are well
known, and assuming that status quo health outcomes are
worth protecting may not always be reasonable. Other
factors, such as equity and fairness, need to be considered
to overcome these limitations.
Allocative efficiency studies have been conducted in
numerous settings over the past decade by our group
and others [13–17]. Although decision-makers have
recognized the importance of optimally allocating
funding to get the best possible health outcomes, it is
still common to incorporate ethical, logistical, and
political constraints to protect the interests of various
groups and ensure that modeling recommendations are
practicable. However, protecting intermediary health
measures (such as program coverage) may not be the most
effective way to protect the health outcomes. Thus,
Pareto efficiency may be a useful addition to the standard
set of tools for evaluating responses to infectious diseases,
even though it cannot be the sole criterion by which
distributional fairness can be assessed.
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